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1 Among middle-class Karachi residents, membership in political parties, or issues which
referred to party politics, are avoided with a vigor that seems out of place in a city where
neighborhoods  were  associated  with  political  affiliations  that  were  both  commonly
known and displayed. During research conducted in 2006-07, although my informants
conveyed  political  sympathies  through  either  vocally  opinionated  conviction  or  by
association with affiliated relatives,  they also actively resisted formal  involvement in
party work. A legacy of violent student politics in the 1980s and 1990s had resulted in
particular  sites,  like Karachi  University,  being heavily  policed by federally  appointed
paramilitary Rangers. At a major women’s community center, the official rules stated that
any mention of either political or religious issues within the compound was prohibited
and  grounds  for  expulsion.  In  alternative  impassioned  accounts,  parents  and
schoolteachers discussed the vigilance necessary to keep their sons from being recruited
into party politics. The major way they managed, they said, was to keep their loved ones
in controlled spaces, often inside their homes. These are common, if underrepresented,
experiences  of  everyday  life  in  urban  Pakistan.  It  is  imperative  for  analyses  of
democratization to draw sustained attention to how bystanders cede to and thus enable
political violence precisely in the moments that they seek to avoid vulnerability.
2 This  article  is  about  evasive  maneuverings.  Infamous  for  its  territorialized  politics,
extremes of  social  inequality and variably regulated urban sprawl,  Karachi  is  equally
marked by the resilience of its residents in the face of now-predictable assertions about
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crisis, failure and instability.1 While an important legacy of scholarship has investigated
the processes of how and why people subscribe to organized identity politics in Karachi,2 I
examine the important category of those who do not. In contrast to the more elaborately
defined  categories  of  victims  and  perpetrators  of  political  violence,  I  focus  on  the
interstitial position of bystanders as a sustained mode of participation through practices
of complicity, subjection and subversion.3 Here, I argue that the bystander is engaged in a
tactics  of  anticipation and interpretation to  assess  and react  to  ‘possibly  benign but
potentially  malevolent  situations’  (Naveeda  Khan  2006). Discourses  and  practices  of
standing by, remaining aloof or avoiding political affiliation by Karachi residents living
on party turf articulate the tense interstices between political mobilization and ‘everyday
peace’ (Ring 2006). The ordinariness of everyday life, as Veena Das (2007) reminds us, is
an achievement; the outcome of ongoing processes of enfolding that incorporate as they
re-make  past  ruptures  into  the  renewed  temporalities  of  daily  experience.  Das
emphasizes  a  definitive  afterward,  through  which  the  temporality  of  a  rupture
remembered is enfolded in the activities and silences of the ordinary. Rather than a clear
aftermath, however, Karachi residents emphasized an ongoing play of contingencies, of
successive ruptures at alternate scales, and the activities of anticipation that were at least
as formative as the contingent futures which they hoped to buffer.
3 The  bystander,  as  an  analytical  concept,  has  been used  in  a  number  of  disciplinary
contexts to develop theories of  participation that  do not map onto the categories of
victim and perpetrator.4 Notably, genocide research and holocaust studies hinge on a
consideration  of  bystanders  as  liminal  positions  that  combine  indirect  forms  of
complicity and subversion (e.g. Ehrenreich & Cole 2005, Staub 1989, 1996, Vetlesen 2000,
2005).5 This literature concludes that even inaction is agential and that intentionality
does  not  determine  complicity.  However,  bystanders  are  equally  marked  by  their
susceptibility or potential to be victimized by the violence they avoid. With particular
reference to bystanders as subjects, S. Lochlann Jain’s article (2004) on pedestrian injury
and automobile design emphasizes that bystander is defined ‘through a vulnerability to
injury’ (Jain 2004: 61). The collusion of actively avoiding and being susceptible to political
violence, however, is shaped by specific forms of assessment, interpretation and tactical
knowledge. 
4 I argue that bystanders engage in a tactics of anticipation. Tactics, as elaborated from
scholarship drawing on Michel de Certeau (1984), combine opportunity and subversion.
In a political context subject to ongoing political instability, Henrik Vigh (2006) describes
such practices in terms of ‘social navigation’: ‘the tactical praxis of navigating networks
and events within a social environment in motion’ (129). Whereas Vigh’s findings show
how  a  particular  tactical  action  of  navigation  is  named  through  a  terminology  of
resourcefulness (2006: 128-137), I suggest that Karachi residents did not use a distinct
taxonomy to describe the practices of bystanders. Instead, their practices were emergent
and  conflicted,  but  informed  by  memories  of  previous  experiences;  I  use  the  term
anticipation to describe them. Rather than definitively transgressive, bystander tactics
subvert  unruly  politics  even  as  they  are  complicit  in  reproducing  their  own
marginalization through a dense conjuncture of self-preservation, resilience and a lack of
other options. The range and scope of tactics that avoid physical harm, recruitment and
the social injuries of political affiliation/enmity are not equally available to all actors in
every moment.  For the proximate and immediate middle-class bystanders of  political
violence  in  Karachi,  the  activity  of  standing  by  is  tactical  in  response  to  but  also,
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significantly,  in anticipation of  their vulnerability.6 At  the same time,  however,  their
interpretations  of  anticipated  possibilities  rely  on  their  participation  precisely  as
bystanders, who abstain from, watch, wait out and thereby subject themselves to that
which they understand as the violence of affiliation.
5 In Karachi’s middle-class neighborhoods that are conspicuously considered the turf or
contested turf  of  political  parties,  tactics  of  standing by took multiple forms.  During
violent scuffles, these involved taking refuge and waiting until the worst was over before
tentatively  emerging  to  resume  more  ordinary  routines.  Where  parents  perceived  a
diffuse  threat,  locating  violence  in  recruitment  and  affiliation,  they  grappled  with
everyday attempts to ply or admonish their children to remain in surveillable spaces.
Other, often younger and unmarried Karachi residents resolved to be fearless, and saw no
paradox in their confident negotiation of variously politicized friendships and activities
that elided any particular party affiliation.
 
Traces
6 The category of the bystander is not new. The existing literature on the MQM carries
traces  of  such  practices,  mentioned  in  passing,  that  hint  at  possibilities  beyond the
activist party member and the victimized opponent. They suggest that it is eminently
possible  to  work  at  remaining  aloof  while  residing  on  party  turf.  In  addition,  they
disabuse  us  of  the  easy  slippages  of  unequivocal  solidarity  or  paralyzing  fear  that
triangulate either staunch and ubiquitous community support or helplessly terrorized
subjugation  from  the  basic  facts  of  organized,  violent  territorial  politics.  For  many
Karachi residents living on party turf, everyday tactics hover somewhere in between the
poles of victim and perpetrator. 
7 In the scholarship on Karachi, few topics have enjoyed the attention of sustained analysis
as  have  political  party  activists  and their  imbrications  in  violence.7 Most  prominent
among the parties examined is the MQM: the Muttahida Qaumi Movement or the United
Nationalist Movement, which changed its name, but not its euphemistic acronym, in 1997
from the  Muhajir  Qaumi  Movement  or  the  Muhajir  Nationalist  Movement.  Based  in
Karachi, the party was founded in 1984, building upon a student organization begun in
1978:  the  All  Pakistan  Muhajir  Students  Organization  (APMSO).  The  founder  of  both
groups, Altaf Hussain, continues to occupy the leadership of the MQM, albeit from self-
imposed exile in London since 1992. Both party organizations mobilized a platform aimed
expressly at a middle-class, Urdu-speaking constituency articulated as a new ethnicity,
which identified Urdu speakers with the historical  category of Partition-era migrants
from India; Muhajirs. As a historical construction, the meanings of the term Muhajir and
the implications of identifying with it have changed over time;8 the formation of the
MQM marks its mobilization as a political identity.
8 More so than any other party in Karachi, the MQM evokes urban violence. Although it is
by no means the only party to do so, scholarship focuses primarily on this particular
party’s  combination  of  identity  politics  and  loosely  organized  excess.  The  MQM’s
formation,  historical  grievances,  platform,  leadership,  organization,  activist  violence,
subjugation by state security forces and those victimized by its activities have been the
object of ongoing academic research.9 As such, the party’s activities between 1985 and
1996, during the height of turf wars with political rivals and armed confrontations with
the police, army and paramilitary Rangers, are well documented. Explanations for this
Bystander Tactics: Life on Turf in Karachi
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 5 | 2011
3
attention  invoke  both  the  scale  and  alleged  popularity  of  the  MQM’s  notoriety  for
violence in conjunction with how it generated a new ethnicity. Less amply studied are the
stories that disrupt the MQM’s hegemonic purchase on political violence subversive of
state interests. A number of issues elide this powerful narrative, notably the more recent
history of a newly legitimized party (Baig 2008), or the ideologies structuring the violent
activities of other parties (e.g. Haq 2007, Nichola Khan 2010c). Building on this growing
attention to alleged peripheries of the ‘proper object’ of the political party, I focus on
those Karachi residents who experienced party activities as bystanders. They may have
been alternately sympathetic with or subjugated by the MQM, but neither worked for nor
had  any  direct  affiliation  with  the  party,  but  nonetheless  lived  turf  controlled,  or
contested  by,  the  MQM.  Paying  closer  attention  to  the  accounts  of  bystanders  can
potentially re-frame how we think about modes of participatory politics, the forms of
participation that make up what we acknowledge as political rather than depoliticized,
and  the  place  of  Pakistanis  who  confound  the  dichotomy  between  victims  and
perpetrators of political violence.
9 The question of  bystanders has become increasingly prominent as  the incidence and
orientation  of  political  violence  associated  with  the  MQM  has  developed  in  new
directions. Although scholars generally focus on its radicalization, the party trajectory
has changed significantly since the late 1990s. Following the 29-month Operation Clean-
Up  against  alleged  MQM activists  between  1992  and  1994,  a  government-sanctioned
attempt to suppress urban violence through a military occupation of the city, the MQM’s
radicalized  side  was  gradually  tempered  by  being  incorporated  and  integrated  into
mainstream politics. In 1997, the MQM and the APMSO dropped the ethno-political term
Muhajir from their names, replacing it with the term muttahida, meaning ‘united,’ in a bid
to supposedly broaden their support base. As of the 2008 elections, the MQM led Karachi’s
city government, and represented the majority of the city constituencies in the Provincial
and National  Assemblies.  In the late 2000s,  however,  renewed occurrences of  violent
confrontation between rival parties and target killings of Pathan business owners suggest
a deliberate slippage into an ethnic register, widely presumed to be at the instigation of
the MQM, in a way that explicitly draws on the memory of the party’s violent activities in
the 1980s and 1990s. More recently, a renewed spate of target killings escalated into an
intensified broader confrontation in summer 2011, variously described as the result of
turf-specific street enmities between the MQM and the PPP-allied party workers,10 in-
fighting between MQM factions, or most conspicuously in the transnational news media,
as a primarily ethnic conflict (see Supreme Court 2011).
 
Turf
10 Considering ‘turf’ raises the issues of a territorialized politics of location, where space and
social relations intersect (Cox 1989). In tandem with official municipal boundaries and
key landmarks mapped through experiences of everyday life,  party turf in Karachi is
heavily context-dependent.  The regulatory status of land relative to state authorities
plays a role in the history of access to and reliance on government services, thus affecting
the positions of parties in a political landscape that may include and overlap with a host
of  relatively  powerful  stakeholders,  such  as  a  land  mafias  (Hasan  1999),  prominent
officials  or  local  gangsters  potentially  trafficking  in  protection  money,  weapons  or
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narcotics. The political territory of turf is also significantly qualified by the multiple and
shifting possibilities of dominance by allied groups or contestation between enemies. 
11 A  growing  scholarship  emphasizes  the  established  observation  that  political  control
focuses  on  local  economic,  bureaucratic  and  infrastructural  neighborhood  resources
(notably Budhani et al. 2010, Gayer 2003, 2007).  Informal squatter settlements not yet
‘regularized’ by the state, despite having their own dedicated counter at the offices of the
Karachi city hall, form the basis for analyses of how community-based housing, struggles
over land rights and limited infrastructure intersect at the site of ethnically motivated
political  animosity.  This  research  highlights  the  ‘rent-seeking  behavior,’  otherwise
termed  extortion  or  protection  rackets,  that  provide  the  ongoing  impetus  for  a
specifically territorial scope for political control; an organization that ‘owns’ an area has
secured the socially recognized privilege not only to occupy and symbolically claim that
space, but also to solicit allegiance as well as funding. Conversely, contract enforcement
and  dispute  arbitration  also  mark  the  commodified  protection  that  characterizes  a
specifically territorially based politics of location (Budhani et al. 2010: 26, 27, Shah 2006).
These forms of political control can be mobilized by gangs, ethnic community coalitions
or political parties, depending on a neighborhood context. Effects of such practices in
formalized,  middle-class  neighborhoods such as  those discussed here include socially
recognized public markers of affiliation, such as exclusive ‘hangouts,’ or social services
reputed to overlap with party sympathies, such as hospital services in the heartland of
party turf.
12 The spatially defined politics that coalesce around the notion of turf  also invoke the
shifting ground of contestations over territory, which complicate the issue of cohesive
group solidarity,  suggesting  a  certain  flexibility  in  how affiliation,  identification and
enmity  change  over time.  Party  turf  can  be  contested,  fought  over  or  eventually
reconfigured  through  new  sets  of  adversaries.  Precisely  because  turf  operates  as  a
‘conspicuous interface between the formal and the informal’ (Budhani et al. 2010: 25), it
contains the possibilities of enforced dominance and thus also of unstable, necessarily
volatile, contestation on a literal terrain of politics. The efficacy of these potentialities
also  shifts  across  moments  of  heightened  tension,  as  well  as  in  terms  of  everyday
experience;  political  symbols and violence are more prominent and less  avoidable in
some moments rather than others. This changeability has itself been folded into social
relations, conventional wisdom and regular routines in Karachi.11
 
Unavoidable
13 In January 2007,  my arrival  at a government college not far from Karachi University
coincided with the agitated din of teachers and students reacting to a college rumble.
Here, political animosities that were repressed by the presence of paramilitary Rangers at
the nearby university campus found more explicit articulation. The key rivalry built on
an historical enmity between the student wings of the standing rival parties, the Jamaat-
i-Islami and the MQM.12 The metal gates at the college entrance and the highest points of
the  mid-rise  building  featured  flags  and  graffiti  tags  of  the  rival  groups,  located  in
conspicuous relation to one another. The unusual proximity of rival markers signified an
ongoing contestation over the college territory as political turf.
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14 The animosity symbolized through visible markers conveyed a political volatility both
indicated by the steel bars that had been fitted onto the women’s side of the building, and
belied by the carefree lounging of young men on the grass, the animated chatter of young
women clustered in small groups, the regularity with which vans and private cars picked
up or dropped off students,  and the college’s reputation for admitting only the most
diligent and studious applicants. Attending such government colleges suggested students’
inability to afford or be admitted to either public universities, or the array of much more
costly privately operated institutions of higher learning. The reputation for a high quality
of education at this particular college implied not only that most students were trying to
get that best education they could within their means, but it also suggested that, relative
to other colleges, student disaffection and politicization did not substantially unsettle the
business of pedagogy.
15 The small college of about five hundred students did not marshal security or surveillance
on  a  scale  comparable  to  the  more  regular  policing  at  universities.  Instead,  the
administration relied on the cooperation of local police and the generational efficacy of
intimidation, as well as the contingent possibility of interpellating normative cultural
values  of  heeding  or  respecting  elders,  teachers  and  figures  of  authority.  As  Oskar
Verkaaik (1994, 2004, 2009) has repeatedly shown, reversing or transgressing normative
hierarchical structures, especially in terms of generational authority, is a key feature of
what makes street politics attractive to young men in Karachi. A college rumble, however,
produces bystanders as well  as victims and perpetrators.  Vectors of participation are
informed by the situated locations, not only of those who engage in the performance of
aggression, but also by those who retreat from, give way to and make space for violent
action. This is exactly why it is imperative to pay sustained attention to how bystanders
enable  the  political  violence  precisely  in  the  moments  that  they  seek  to  avoid
vulnerability.
16 I had visited the college on a number of perfectly uneventful occasions. A teacher offered
to introduce me to her class of male students and we arranged to meet. Our meeting on
the girls’ side of the gender-segregated campus had barely begun when it was disrupted
by the male voice of a college employee yelling ‘the atmosphere has gone bad!’(mahaul
kharab  ho  gaya  hai!).  This  provoked no hesitation among the  women students.  In  an
immediate  stream  of  neatly  pressed  beige  student  uniforms,  over  a  hundred  young
women flowed into the gated interior corridor that was separated from the courtyard by
metal bars. A few screamed and some pushed, rushing into the hallway before the heavy
gates were padlocked, which effectively locked in the young women and administrators
while the male students, lounging on their half of the gender-segregated grounds, were
left  to  fend for  themselves.  The range of  reactions and recognitions  did  not  convey
surprise. The specific activities of getting out of the way had the clear tenor of familiarity.
The entire women’s section had been warned, relocated and secured in a safe inside space
in less than a minute. No one had fumbled to find the lock. It seemed that I had been the
only one confused or uncertain about what was going on. Many women students went
directly into the classroom interiors,  but a sparse crowd gazed through the bars and
across the campus,  trying to make out what was happening.  I  was instantly shuttled
through to an adjacent office, where female teachers and staff, marked by the privilege of
not being in uniform, took refuge.
17 Led through a second gated door into the inner sanctum of the principal’s office, I caught
an onslaught of fragmentary details through the clamor of staff comments. A scuffle was
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happening right at the gate at the entry to the college, which foiled the usual strategy of
closing the main gates to contain or cut off the disturbances. The teacher I had come to
meet turned to me and asked whether I had noticed anything as I had come in. I thought
about it and remembered a silence unusual only in retrospect, however, as young men in
college uniforms and in t-shirts looked at each other, seemingly haphazardly clustered
just inside and just outside the main gates. With every evidence of being unperturbed, the
teacher sat demurely with me on a wood frame sofa and tried to make polite small talk
while  on  the  desk  adjacent  to  us  the  principal,  an  outspoken  middle-aged  woman,
alternately yelled at and pleaded with the police on the phone. She admonished them for
not coming when she had called ten minutes earlier, when staff had first gotten wind of a
potential escalation. This would have been several minutes before I had arrived at the
college,  suggesting  that  I  had  walked  through  the  main  gates,  the  epicenter  of  the
conflict, just as teachers had begun watching for signs of escalation. Meanwhile, about
thirty male staff members delivered sporadic reports about the logistical difficulty of
clamping down of a violent scuffle at the threshold of the main gates, about skinny boys
bearing cricket bats as weapons, about bleeding wounds after only ten minutes, and about
memories of previous conflicts where boys had slashed each other with the jagged ends of
neon tube lights taken from classroom ceilings. 
18 Memories of past experiences informed anticipatory tactics, scripting them into actions
so regularized that they had become routine. Call the police. Berate the police. Warn the
students. Padlock the women’s section. Try to close the main gates. Watch for blood or
other forms of escalation. Wait in a place of refuge for the violence to subside or the
police to intervene. Tentatively emerge to reclaim spaces where the violence occurred
and resume more regular, less extraordinary, routines.
19 The teacher’s small  talk fizzled quickly.  She asserted that this sort  of  things did not
happen often, and gave me three versions of what happened, modifying the account in
relation to common motifs of criminality, ethnic conflict and political animosities as she
went along. Initially, she maintained, there were just ten or twelve boys involved; they
were  bad  apples.  A  few moments  later,  she  narrated  the  rumors  of  an  ethnic  clash
between  Punjabis  and  Pathans.  Ultimately,  however,  she  explained  that  there  were
people  that  came from the outside  to  create  trouble  among our  students.  By  this,  I
understood that she meant that party workers and recruiters who were not students
helped to instigate and sustain political animosities on a college campus where, despite
the  overt  symbols  that  marked  it  as  a  contested  party  turf,  any  form  of  student
organization  had  been  officially  banned  for  twenty-three  years.  In  her  ongoing
modification  of  an  explanatory  narrative,  the  teacher  offered  me  a  succession  of
predictably familiar formulae,  in effect testing how susceptible I  might be to leaning
towards stories of individual responsibility, naturalized ethnic animosity, or the ‘hidden
hand’ of organized politics. That the teacher referred to political parties rather than to
any other form of affiliation was implicit in her clear references to recent newspaper
debates about banned student groups and allegedly external provocateurs, as well as the
painted colors and graffiti on the campus buildings extolling the rival student wings of
the MQM and the Jamaat-i-Islami. 
20 In using a common set of euphemisms referring to party workers, she asserted that the
students  were  not  involved,  but  immediately  backtracked,  admitting  ‘maybe  a  few
students,  but  we  can’t  do  anything  to  them.’  This  oblique  reference  amplified  the
explanation  that  remained  unsaid,  if  clear  in  many  other  stories  and  accounts:  the
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inability of teachers and staff to reprimand or otherwise engage such students rested on
the fear of anticipated repercussions for themselves and their families, in terms of threats
and intimidation. In effect, the anticipation of consequences was enough to keep teachers
and staff from taking their  chances in trying to assert  their  authority.  These tactics
anticipated not only scuffles to avoid, but also the potential effects of direct intervention
for their families and situations at the workplace. It was, thus, anticipation in multiple
degrees. I had met others who appeared less concerned with the palpable ramifications of
harassment,  but  perhaps  they had had alternative  resources  that  permitted them to
consider themselves fearlessly immune. The teachers and staff at this college evidently
did not share such sentiments. Not one dared to attempt asserting their authority against
the confrontation at the gate. Instead, they took refuge inside and waited for the police.
21 ‘So,’  the  teacher  concluded,  gesturing  to  the  situation  of  barricaded  domestic
confinement which formed the context for our conversation, ‘we get terrorized like this.’
Her use of the plural ‘we’ indicated that to attempt to avoid the entanglements of party
politics, but nonetheless become embroiled in its moments of danger, hailed a shared
experience that merited a collective nomination. I suggest that naming this collective
experience indicates a shared sensibility, points towards a broader sociality, and alludes
to a modality of participation constituted by the tactics of being a bystander to politicized
violence. Eventually, I was escorted through the school gate post-lockdown, where police
vehicles were stationed on either side of the campus grounds, only to find that a number
of  the few cars outside had suffered collateral  damage,  pelted by rocks,  and to hear
accounts of the sudden escalation of tension into violence that had scattered bystanders
to take hurried cover.
22 The teacher used the English term ‘terrorized’ to describe the anxious group of teachers,
students and staff  who watched and waited for the rumble to be over from within a
refuge  of  walls  and metal  bars.  Her  usage  effected a  distinction between those  who
engaged in politicized violence and those who did not. In tandem with their subjection,
precisely  through  the  tactics  of  avoiding  involvement  and  thus  minimizing  their
susceptibility  to  injury,  the  bystanders  worked against  violent  confrontations  by not
participating in them. This  was about more than fear;  it  was about the resilience of
waiting and resolutely reclaiming spaces that had, at one time or another, been sites of
violence. As such, standing by entailed specific activities and practices of anticipation,
both during instances of heightened animosity as well as during the times of suggestion
and potentiality, where the possibility of benign or threatening situations was continually
assessed and interpreted.
23 Anticipation is, by its very definition, ensconced in contingency, hypotheses and ‘best
guesses’  based  on  past  experiences  and  available  information.  For  all  that,  it  is
nonetheless something that Karachi residents do to make their lives both bearable and
sustainable  in  a  situation  of  variable  and  volatile  levels  of  political  violence.  Such
practices  of  standing  by  simultaneously  reject  while  conceding  space  to,  and  thus
perpetuating,  politicized aggression.  As  a  result,  attempting to  avoid  vulnerability  is
neither  intentionally  nor  effectively  transgressive.  While  it  subverts  party  claims  to
representative identity politics by drawing explicit attention to the persons and tactics
that  violent  political  mobilization  excludes,  it  is  also  complicit  in  reproducing  the
subjection and marginalization of a majority, whose main concern of self-preservation
indicates resilience as well as a lack of other feasible options.
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24 As the incident at the college demonstrates, anticipatory practices are not equally open to
everyone in the same ways. Whereas female students were the most physically distant
from the center of the conflict, but were also able to retreat into an enclosed and secure
part of the building, male students were left by the administration to fend for themselves,
to improvise their own refuge. In addition, teachers and administrative staff had access to
even more insulated interiors; to rooms with locks and supplemental sets of bars. This
contrasted markedly with the pedestrians, cars and drivers who had been just outside the
gates when the scuffle began. Caught in the open area of the college driveway, they dove
for cover behind the few parked vehicles as the enemy groups first pelted one another
with rocks, and then the cars behind which bystanders were cowering. These modes of
evasion  demonstrate  a  set  of  differentiated  practices  that  characterize  the  ongoing
condition of the bystander in a context that is regularly, if not in every moment, suffused
by violence.
25 The  principal  form of  vulnerability  from which  students,  teachers,  staff  and  drivers
withdrew was one of physical harm. At least, staying out of harm’s way was what they
had in common. For students,  however,  this physical threat was compounded by the
potential malevolence of affiliation; solidarity with one side not only strengthened ties of
association, it also generated new categories of enmity with a host of rival organizations.
As I repeatedly heard, those who do not retreat must be protected by and affiliated with
someone, which meant that they must also have been someone else’s enemy. Conversely,
the hesitation of  teachers  and staff  to  test  their  authority  against  volatile  and well-
protected students indicated their awareness of possible retribution, and the fragility of
culturally  normative  hierarchy  in  the  face  of  violent  intimidation.  The  teacher  had
suggested as much in her comment that evoked the conventional wisdom of fixed exam
results  and  coerced  grade  inflation,  in  addition  to  violent  outbreaks:  ‘We  can’t  do
anything to them.’ Thus, the tactics that avoided physical harm also anticipated social
injuries, for students, of direct involvement in an economy of affiliation, and for teachers,
of potentially losing the symbolic force of their authority.
 
Parents
26 Analogous to the authority figures of teachers and staff at the college, who worked to
protect students by shuttling some of them into an interior refuge, parents also acted as
bystanders. The parents I spoke to resided on party turf, but strove to keep their children
from becoming involved in party politics. For them, the animosity that escalated into the
college  rumble  was  rendered  much  more  diffuse;  they  emphasized  the  foundational
violence of  affiliation.  As  such,  the protracted threat  was  not  conflict  itself,  but  the
tantalizingly  benign  fabric  of  friendship,  leisure  and  admiration  that  promised  a
palliative to unemployment,  frustration and vulnerability.  Parental anxiety was about
recruitment  and  the  presumed  irreversibility  of  this  particular  political  affiliation.
However,  neither all  adults nor all  young people shared these worries.  Some seemed
confident in their capacity to negotiate and navigate any set of pitfalls, whereas others
were convinced that fear and the politics of enmity belonged to an antiquated economy of
affiliation. Their confidence did not exclude the anxiety of their parents or peers, who
alternately worried and goaded them into different forms of prudence.
27 Parents used a host of tactics to navigate and manage the rhythms of everyday party
politics in their lives. In particular, they shared accounts of how they struggled to keep
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their children safe, to keep their sons from being recruited into party politics, to protect
them. I focus on the narratives of two parents who lived in Nazimabad, a neighborhood
known as a historically important political turf of the MQM, as well as one parent who
had moved away from Nazimabad during the turf wars of the late 1980s, and now resided
in Faisal Colony, a part of New Karachi, on a street that was part of the contested terrain
between the MQM and the Jamaat-i-Islami. All these parents invoked the MQM rather
than any other party, typically using oblique references they and many other residents
considered unequivocally obvious. Investigating their narratives presents an important
complement to extensive studies of the political  party as an object:  how the MQM is
imagined by the scores who are not party workers in its own ‘heartland.’
28 Nazimabad was established in the 1950s,  one of  several  neighborhoods planned on a
government initiative to  house the hundreds of  thousands of  refugee migrants  from
India.  It  is  located  in  the  western half  of  Karachi,  and consists  of  five  major  areas,
composed  largely  of  row housing.  Although a  number  of  Muhajir-dominated  parties
operated there, Nazimabad continued to be considered the turf of the MQM. Party flags in
the telltale colors of red, green and white lined streets and roundabouts. MQM colors
were painted around lampposts and on fountains. Neighborhood parks were named for
martyrs,  that is,  party workers killed during the government military operation that
clamped down on the city for 29 months between 1992 and 1994. Immediately adjacent to
the  ‘no-go  areas’  declared  off-limits  by  police  and  government  security  personnel,
Nazimabad was affected by curfews and street violence during the infamous turf wars of
the period. The time I had spent there in 2006 and 2007 had been comparatively peaceful,
where  MQM  representatives  had  dominated  Karachi’s  local  government.  Regular,  if
variable, levels of violence persisted in the area, as well as in several other proximate
neighborhoods  where  the  MQM  had  been  particularly  active  a  dozen  years  before.
Nonetheless, Nazimabad can be considered an aftermath (Das 2007).13 This neighborhood
of over sixty thousand residents made palpable not only the memories of a protracted
period of urban unrest, but also a host of other social effects: droves of residents moving
out in the late 1980s, new residents moving in beginning in the late 1990s, parks where
families could picnic and where women could stroll with their friends in the evenings.
The long-standing Nazimabad residents I knew were the ones who had stayed behind,
whether out of conviction or compulsion. Several claimed that they were some of the
very few left on their blocks, that everyone else had moved away a decade earlier, and
that they did not know their neighbors anymore.
29 Conversely, Faisal Colony was part of the larger area of New Karachi, initially established
as part of the Greater Karachi Resettlement Plan in the late 1950s, a failed government
initiative and basically ‘an eviction drive’ (Budhani et al. 2010: 20), to resettle poor refugee
migrants living in squatter settlements to areas 20 km away from the city center.14 The
industrial expansion that was supposed to accompany the residential development, and
provide employment for those who moved there, never materialized. As a result, ‘half’ of
the resettled residents returned to living in the inner city to be closer to their workplaces
(Hasan in Zaidi 1997: 3286), many poor families sold their plots to speculators who re-sold
the land to middle-income buyers,  and the project  continued to face financial  issues
several  decades later due to the difficulty in collecting the dues intended to recover
government investment (Zaidi 1997: 3286). According to the 1998 census, Faisal Colony
was estimated to house approximately sixty thousand residents.15
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30 During the period of my fieldwork, New Karachi was consistently featured in the news;
stories about shots fired or dead bodies found in the neighborhood were common. During
that time, Jamaat-i-Islami representatives ran the local government of the area, but were
consistently challenged by MQM activists.16 The residents of Faisal Colony were largely
Muhajirs, although people from diverse ethnic, linguistic and religious groups also lived
there.  The residential  roads were narrow,  and the homes combined small  apartment
buildings, row housing and compact bungalows. Homes were conspicuously walled and
gated, although space inside them was at a premium. Although motorcycles and vans
transporting schoolchildren were common, I did not see many private cars beside the one
I was using. This was a precariously middle-class neighborhood.
31 The parents residing in Nazimabad and Faisal Colony described why young men would be
attracted to party politics, and explained how they, as parents, tried to counter the allure
of affiliation. Not only did a party offer the intimacy of allies and supporters, which might
play  out  in  contexts  ranging  from  employment  to  hospital  services  to  targeted
intimidation, but it also offered monetary compensation to activists. Of all the parties, I
was told, the MQM paid out the highest allowance and had the most well-paid workers.
Where  unemployment  was  a  common  complaint,  party  politics  was  bound  up  in  a
political economy of social  distinction and disposable income. The parents I  spoke to
recognized that the slippage between a party worker’s allowance, leisure spending and
powerful friends held some attraction for their children.
32 These parents formulated an idiom of protection that relegated their sons to supervised
spaces, also enlisting the influence of friends, neighbors or local elders to persuade their
sons  to  understand  the  necessity  of  a  particular  course  of  action.  Persuasion  and
surveillance made up the tactics they used to anticipate and through which they hoped to
prevent recruitment.  Young men were dangerously vulnerable precisely because they
were  culturally  understood  to  be  more  independent,  and  less  subject  to  parental
supervision,  than  young  women.  Parental  oversight  thus  relied  upon  enforcing  the
normative hierarchies of generational authority, but also upon the emotionally intimate
forms of persuasion, that politicized sons were thought to be immune to (Verkaaik 1994,
2004). These parents struggled with the knowledge that their influence could only be
indirect, that it could only anticipate, but not definitively foreclose, that their children
successfully avoided potential threats. Both mothers and fathers explained the means and
impossibilities of controlling the movements of adult sons.
33 Samina Baji was an Urdu-speaking housewife and mother of five in her mid-forties. Like
most of the people I knew, her parents and grandparents had migrated to Pakistan from
Uttar  Pradesh as  Muhajirs.  Samina Baji  had resided in  different  parts  of  Nazimabad
throughout her life. She described barely going outside when she first moved in with her
husband’s family in the mid-1980s, during the years when ‘the atmosphere was bad,’ and
they had regularly heard gunfire through the front door. Twenty years later her family
had moved to the same block she had lived on as a child, but most of the old neighbors
had moved away in the interim. 
34 She had two grown sons, and spoke of the one that had found work abroad, in the United
Arab Emirates, with visible relief. The other son was currently unemployed. She hesitated
for a few moments before describing the potential dangers that ultimately outweighed
the benefits of being recruited as a party worker.  In an agitated tone that combined
sympathy and anxiety, Samina Baji told me that if a son joined any political party, then
everything was futile, useless (bekar).  She explained that they would never be able to
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leave that party and if they tried, they would probably be killed. And the poor things, she
said, they feel frustrated and have no contacts or no money. At least from the party, they
get some cash and some importance. Maybe the party will help them to get a job. But, she
insisted,  it  is  so  dangerous  and  a  disaster  for  the  family.  Samina  Baji  outlined  her
objective and alluded to meager tactics she had used to try to anticipate and foreclose the
possibility of recruitment. Acknowledging that her attempts to control her sons were
ineffectual, but still turned out well in the end, she pointed to the radical contingency
that rendered anticipatory practice an ongoing, flawed if hopeful, anxiety-fueled project.
The biggest thing, Samina Baji explained, is to keep your boys from joining a party–and
you can yell at them and keep them inside like girls, but they are not girls. She asserted
that by the grace of Allah her boys had not joined parties. That they had not despite
residing in an MQM stronghold remained the unspoken context of her narrative, and
from  the  breathless  way  that  Samina  Baji  had  conveyed  relief  as  she  ended  the
conversation, this result had evidently not been a foregone conclusion.
35 Samina  Baji  had  hoped  to  keep  her  sons  from  being  recruited  by  political  parties,
although  she  knew  that  their  frustration  and  difficulties  in  finding  respectable
employment  made  party  membership  seem attractive.  She  focused,  however,  on  the
trade-off  between  protective  affiliation  and  family  solidarity.  Her  own  tactics  of
anticipation had been, by her own admission, fueled by hope and anxiety, and had not
been deciding factors in the outcome. Despite her acknowledgement of forces beyond her
control, Samina Baji nonetheless tried to engage the parental modes of authority through
which she desperately wanted to be persuasive.
36 Omer Sahib was an entrepreneur who lived in Nazimabad and operated a small real estate
business. His family had also migrated from Uttar Pradesh at Partition and had lived in
the neighborhood since the mid-1950s. He used specific tactics to anticipate the potential
violence  of  party  involvement,  and described  how he had  kept  his  sons  from being
recruited into political parties by encouraging them to pursue hobbies indoors. He told
me that the key to keeping kids away from political organizations was to keep them off
the street. By this, he explained that he meant keeping young men inside the home rather
than have them sitting on a roadside curb or in a local hangout, where they would be
vulnerable to recruitment through association and informal friendship with members of
organizations (tanzimi log). Omer Sahib described his strategy as giving his sons things
that they could use inside, buying these things and thus investing in them, such as a
television or videogames. Omer Sahib framed consumer desires as a distraction from, as
well as compensation for, the social and affective networks that political involvement
offered. He described how one of his sons had been interested in the game of carrom
board,  generally  played on a  large  wooden board in  local  gaming dens,  which were
perceived as dangerous because of the presence of gambling and unsavory characters.
Omer Sahib promptly bought his son his own board for the exorbitant price of about one
hundred  dollars  (equivalent  to  5000  rupees  in  2007).  He  described  the  process  as  a
reflexively anticipatory, deliberate and multilayered performance, where he had taken
his  son  to  the  bazaar  and  asked  him  which  carrom  board  he  wanted.  Omer  Sahib
elaborated that his buying the board, and pulling out that much money at the bazaar, had
produced the effect of being a ‘big man’ or important person, at least in the eyes of his
son. Secondly, he noted, it showed that he spent or invested in keeping his kids sheltered
and out of undesirable places. Finally, Omer Sahib said that buying the carrom board had
been a way to gain the trust of his son, as an indulgent parent, which would bind the boy
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even more closely to his father and family. Quite literally, the father explained that his
son would probably bring his friends to play carrom in his home; that is, in a safe and
controlled surveillable place. He thus orchestrated an intricate situation that anticipated
the allure of leisure activities while cultivating the figure of the indulgent parent as an
effective patron.
37 Whereas Samina Baji narrated specifically domestic confinement as a key modality of
avoiding what she described as the futility of party membership, Omer Sahib extended
these tactics to a more generalized distancing from unsupervised, and thus potentially
unruly,  locations.  To  evade  such  dangers,  Omer  Sahib  performatively  fostered  an
indulgent  relationship with his  sons,  indexed through his  willingness to strategically
invest monetary resources so as to cultivate a particular form of intimacy that doubles as
protective  surveillance.  In  countering  party  involvement  with  structured  activities
requiring conspicuous consumption, he appeals explicitly to his sons’ desires (khwaishat)
in order to connect them to family resources, rather than a potentially volatile exterior
space.
38 For Omer Sahib, vulnerability to party recruitment was importantly linked to informal
acquaintances made in unsupervised spaces. His tactics, therefore, were to attempt to
compete  with  the  attractions  of  such  spaces  by  channeling  leisure  activities  into  a
domestic location. He explained how his efforts had been successful, but this had not
made them any more than contingent and hopeful at the outset. Like Samina Baji, his
alternative  to  party  recruitment  depended  on  reinforcing  family  solidarity  and  the
relationships within the household.
39 Allegedly controlled spaces did not always ensure protection, however. Schools posed a
problem for the idiom of protection and supervision, because time in the schoolyard,
commuting, or doing homework with classmates was not structured by teachers. In such
cases,  parents  knew that  their  tactics  were  limited  to  anticipation;  assurances  were
contingent and sustaining the position of a bystander meant opting to remain vulnerable
and susceptible to injury. That this was a conflicted and difficult stance to maintain was
acutely felt by Anjum Baji, a housewife and mother of five children. She lived with her
husband and mother-in-law in Faisal Colony, where the Jamaat-i-Islami and the MQM
were actively struggling for control of the neighborhood and its local government. This
situation  was  especially  salient  for  her  family,  because  Anjum Baji’s  husband  was  a
member of the Jamaat-i-Islami. 
40 As she told me about young MQM workers who harassed local residents, her narrative
slipped  into  a  harrowing  discussion  about  how  her  fifteen-year-old  son  faced  party
animosity in the schoolyard. Sons of MQM workers had begun taunting him because his
father worked for the Jamaat-i-Islami. This account suggests that the political affiliation
of  parents  is  often  passed  onto  children  by  association.  Anjum  Baji  explained  that
schoolboys were being recruited,  plied with small  rewards and motorcycle rides,  and
encouraged to demonstrate their loyalty by physically assaulting enemies constituted
through  the  impetus  to  defend  the  honor  of  their  fathers.  Voice  strained  and  eyes
watering,  she described how she had encouraged her son to avoid such activities,  to
remain aloof, and to try to be a bystander. Her tactics, which her tears acknowledged as
limited and removed from the schoolyard, persuaded him to rely on piety and virtuous
conduct: I have explained to him, son, just be a good Muslim and Allah will keep you safe.
Don’t look, she said, don’t respond, just be a good Muslim, I have explained this to him. To
advise the use of piety, rather than violence or affiliation, as a form of protection drew on
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the  religiously  informed  platform  of  the  Jamaat-i-Islami,  but  Anjum  Baji  explicitly
exhorted her son to equate effective piety with the position of the bystander. The active
component of this stance included not looking or responding to the taunts of his peers;
this was implicitly part of what it meant to be a good, respectable, middle-class Muslim
boy in a  schoolyard.  Anjum Baji’s  fears  clearly  anticipated her  son potentially  being
beaten, killed or otherwise bound up in the economy of street battles and threats that
political activity in Karachi implied. By telling her son to just be a good Muslim, Anjum
Baji exhorted him to ignore the provocations of his classmates and focus on piety as a
sufficient means for maintaining virtue and navigating the pitfalls of the schoolyard. The
implication, through his mother’s anxiety, was that if he were a good Muslim, he could
successfully avoid messy economies of affiliation, intimidation and violence; Allah would
protect him through an alternate, if no less contingent, tactics of anticipation.
41 Whereas Samina Baji  and Omer Sahib maintained that avoiding the vulnerabilities of
party recruitment depended on spatial control and confinement, Anjum Baji attempted to
urge her son to pious moral conduct in order to evade provocation. In imploring him not
to look and not to respond to taunts, she pleaded with him not to enact a definitive
affiliation that would symbolically justify a potentially violent enmity. Her advice to her
son pre-empted recruitment itself, as well as physical harm; its most immediate concern
was  to  avoid  actions  that  could  be  interpreted  as  affiliation,  and  extrapolated  into
opposition by dangerous rivals. There was no guarantee, of course, that her son would
heed his mother’s words or evade politicized bullying, and I believe that this knowledge is
what brought Anjum Baji to tears. As a mother, she could only try to convince him that he
had a choice in deciding whether or not to get involved.
42 The efforts and anxieties of these parents demonstrate a mode of evading involvement in
political organizations, and thus rejecting violence through the position of the bystander,
on behalf  of  their  children.  They suggest  a generational  imaginary of  avoiding party
membership,  through  a  tactics  that  anticipates  that  the  dangers  of  affiliation  are
ultimately potentially far more treacherous than the contingent and carefully hopeful
vulnerability  of  the  bystander:  retreating,  waiting,  trying  not  to  look,  trying  not  to
respond. How do you keep your children from joining a party? How do you keep your
sons safe? According to Samina Baji and Omer Sahib, keep them inside, at home, off the
streets.  Anjum Baji suffered through the anxiety of knowing that she could not help,
control or protect her son in the schoolyard. These parents’ efforts were not oriented
towards  confronting,  containing  or  opposing  potentially  violent  political  organizing.
Instead, they wanted their children to avoid such situations, and subscribe instead to the
cultural and affective primacy of kinship solidarity. Although their priorities set up a
contest between mobilization and the order of familial hierarchy, as has been explored in
terms of  generational  tension (e.g. Verkaaik 1994,  2004),  directly anticipated in these
parents’ narratives is the possibility of physical harm brought on by the enmities that are
part and parcel of affiliation with, and protection by, a powerful organization. The threat
is thus in the inflexibility that affiliation brings. 
43 Conversely, however, just as in the retreat of bystanders in the college rumble, these
tactics  ultimately  make  space  for  the  intimidating  danger  of  political  affiliation,
reinforcing  its  power,  and  perpetuating  its  efficacy.  The  options  offered  involve  a
withdrawal  into  domestic  interiors,  and  a  moral  ground  to  refuse  provocation.  The
subversion enacted here is complicit, and enacts subjection even as it feels like a form of
resistance. For all that may seem that anticipatory practices are described as elective, for
Bystander Tactics: Life on Turf in Karachi
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 5 | 2011
14
the reader as well as for the Karachi residents I have described until now, such tactics are
experienced as compulsion.
44 Parents’ accounts show us that anxiety, fear and an idiom of protecting and supervising
young men are bound up in the affective, extra-institutional practices and imaginaries
that are conjoined with political institutions in Karachi. However, not all residents of
party turf are quite so anxious about the potential malevolence of proximity to political
affiliation. Some are also fearless, defiant and confident in their own abilities to navigate
and negotiate a range of situations.
 
Unafraid
45 A  particular  sentiment  was  generally  repeated  by  those  who  were  old  enough  to
remember the fear (khauf) that had pervaded the 1980s and 1990s: ‘Nowadays, people
don’t heed hooliganism’ (ajkal log badmashi nahin mante). The verb for acquiescence–manna
–was  the  same one used to  describe  relations  between subordinates  and authorities;
children listening to or obeying parents and teachers, or young people doing what elders
told them to. The negation of this compliance indicated fearlessness, recklessness and an
indignant  refusal  to  tolerate  the  paranoid  expectation  of  threats  and  blackmail.
Nonetheless, even for those Karachi residents who confidently sustained relationships
with a host of variously politically affiliated contacts and friends, conversations about
parties were abruptly cut off if someone with unknown sympathies entered a room, and
the allusions to fearlessness were couched in quiet voices and oblique references—those
who spoke loudly and frankly were either surrounded by friends, protected by affiliation,
or considered simultaneously careless, brave and naïve.
46 In contrast to the bystanders whose tactics anticipated proximity and familiarity with
party  affiliates  as  potentially  dangerous,  other,  often  younger,  Karachi  residents
confidently sustained relationships with active members of rival parties (Baig 2008: xvi-
xix, Nichola Khan 2010a: 131-133), ignored the pressure to definitively affiliate with any
group, or otherwise disregarded the anxiety that their own vulnerability might engender.
While  their  approach  did  not  instrumentalize  political  affiliation  as  a  social  field
commodified protection (Shah 2006), its navigations were pointedly–if only, according to
their elders, temporarily–fearless. In contrast to the suggestion by Pradeep Jeganathan
(2000)  that  restraint  and  fearlessness  are  opposed  in  relation  to  violence,  these
bystanders demonstrate a stance that is fearless precisely because it holds onto restraint.
As such, their tactics of anticipation further elaborate the practices of active bystanders
that awkwardly combine subjection, subversion and complicity.
47 Some young people offered a counter-narrative to their parents’ concerns; they avoided
street politics and everyday urban unrest through defiance rather than out of fear. One
example  was  confidently  brandished  by  Bushra,  an  unmarried  Urdu-speaking  young
woman in her early twenties.  She lived in what I  was told was the best  lane in the
neighborhood; young people would travel there from other sectors in Nazimabad, just to
comfortably spend time with friends in this lane. Its reputation designated it as a haven
where it was possible to avoid party politics.  As her mother looked on with concern,
Bushra asserted the difference between this lane and the others in Nazimabad: we go
outside, she said. She described those parents who did not let their children out because
of fear (bacchon ko nikalna nahin dete khauf ke waje se). The solution, she said, was simple:
don’t be scared, get rid of the fear, finish it–go outside (mat darna, khauf khatam karna–
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bahar nikalna).  Bushra joked about how neighbors and young people would linger on
doorsteps in the evenings, watching each other and gossiping cheerfully. As she spoke,
her mother wrung her hands and knit her brow.
48 A parent’s fear and a child’s defiance existed in relation to each other, both formulating
differential tactics for an everyday life that avoided party politics. Bushra explained that
small blockades at either end of the lane served as a barrier, preventing access by boys on
motorcycles commonly associated with the potential for easy, inexpensive mobility. This
helped to prevent muggings and mobile phone theft,  she said. The barriers had been
erected when a recently elected local politician, who lived on that block, had his cellular
phone  stolen  at  gunpoint.  The  event  implied  that  younger  party  workers  had
inadvertently mugged a senior MQM party member in the heartland of their mutual turf.
The prominent neighbor acted as a buffer for Bushra’s fearlessness by establishing the
material conditions facilitating the easy leisure of residents. Not everyone on the block
perceived these conditions as inviting, however. Bushra’s mother narrated that the new
people who had moved into the neighborhood since the late 1990s kept to themselves and
kept their children indoors; we hardly know what they look like, she exclaimed. Evidence
of this novel anonymity was cited through an incident where it had taken three days to
identify the victim of a nearby accident; longstanding residents had not recognized that
he lived on their block.
49 The fact that Bushra so comfortably defied the vulnerability to violence,  mugging or
recruitment  was  made possible  by  an influential  party-affiliated  neighbor.  Thus,  her
fearlessness was sustained by the politics of MQM turf, even as she and several other
young people maintained that the relative safety of the lane depended on the lack of
pressure to join the party. Bushra’s resolution to go outside and be unafraid was a highly
contingent  subversion;  it  was  anchored  in  the  spatial  circumstances  of  protective
affiliation. More starkly than in the examples of the college rumble or the narratives of
parents, Bushra’s tactics were shaped by what party-affiliated actors allowed to happen in
the spaces they ostensibly controlled.
50 Several  young men seemed to successfully navigate amongst  party networks without
resorting to any bottom line of official  affiliation.  Their friends had various levels of
involvement in different parties, while they managed to remain aloof. One young man
who was just finishing high school confided his anxieties; he had heard that boys were
advised to join a political party upon entering university, which was supposed to ensure a
protective network, as well as access to the social capital that could provide access to
resources. His worries did not seem to correspond, however, to the experiences of many
of the students I knew. Another acquaintance, a university student, would occasionally
mention acquaintances or rallies that he had attended, often of historically oppositional
parties. Several others mentioned friends that were active in campus politics, although
they were not involved themselves. The pressure to become an official member of a party,
they told me, was not as strong as it had been a decade earlier. Joining a party, they said,
was no longer necessary. What do we make of these spaces of navigating avoidance, these
people  who mediate  between interests  and affiliations  whose  stakes  were  frequently
described in absolute terms? I  maintain that their engagements are more than mere
retreat;  they  constitute  the  active  tactics  of  bystanders,  albeit  ones  who  seem  less
perturbed about potential dangers and more confident in their own capacities of ‘social
navigation’ (Vigh 2006).
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51 An Urdu-speaking university student in his twenties, Farid Bhai narrated the way he had
avoided recruitment. He sustained relationships with friends that had a range of political
affiliations. He told me that some of his closest friends were key members in the student
wing of the Jamaat-i-Islami or the MQM. Despite fraternizing with active members of
enemy  organizations  on  the  same  campus,  Farid  Bhai  avoided  becoming  officially
affiliated with any political party. He had attended the rallies of historically oppositional
parties, and had occasionally mentioned his exhilaration in a crowd of MQM supporters
or  his  sympathy  with  the  political  platform  of  the  Jamaat-i-Islaami.  I  suspected  a
generational  and  historical  component  that  made  his  conduct  feasible  when  he
mentioned that the elder brothers of several of his friends were involved in some level of
political organizing, as either workers or administrators, although the friends considered
themselves unaffiliated. Perhaps time had made it easier for social networks not to be
conflated with affiliation, but perhaps this was an orientation that was possible for the
imaginary of a younger generation; parents and teachers used tropes of friendship and
seduction to refer to the slippery slope of recruitment.
52 He told me that an old family friend had risen to a prominent position in the MQM. At
sixteen,  Farid  Bhai  had  been  offered  a  well-paid  clerical  position  in  the  MQM’s
administration, which he flatly refused. Fear or anxiety never came up in his narrative,
although the dramatic description of ‘flatly refusing’ party employment suggested Farid
Bhai’s awareness that his actions were daring, and could easily have been interpreted as
both insolence and bravery.  Rejecting the offered position had not prompted him to
modify his relationship with party members, however. He asserted that it had not been a
problem to remain on good terms with them afterward. Farid Bhai, and several other
young men or middle-aged women like him, comfortably maintained an amazingly varied
array of friends and acquaintances who had an equally dizzying array of bureaucratic,
economic and political affiliations. None of them were invested in explicitly opposing, or
working  against,  the  structures  of  affiliation  they  navigated.  As  such,  they  did  not
constitute  their  actions  as  resistance;  instead,  their  tactics  were  simultaneously
subversive and complicit, but accompanied by an affect of wily, slippery mischief rather
than the anxious fear so prominent in the examples of the college rumble and parents’
narratives. Farid Bhai and others like him most convincingly articulate their tactics as
elective,  although the ability to make such choices depends equally on the ability to
negotiate or successfully wriggle one’s way out of unfavorable situations. In mobilizing
social capital, they worked at the interstices of the organizations and institutions that
shaped Karachi’s political terrain.
53 This did not mean, however, that Farid Bhai was not cautious, although I must note that
he  was  most  prudent  when  his  mother  was  the  most  adamantly  insistent  about  it.
Nonetheless,  his  particular  combination  of  a  pious  ‘reputation,’  a  knowledgeable
articulate demeanor, as well as his informal and non-party community involvement may
have  contributed  to  his  effective  navigation  of  an  economy  of  affiliation.  Although
fearlessness  was  an  explicit  aspect  of  Farid  Bhai’s  tactics,  his  longstanding  personal
relationship  with  the  prominent  MQM  party  member  configured,  not  only  the
particularly generous offer of recruitment, but the way his ‘flat’  refusal was benignly
received. I knew of another situation in which the recruitee had locked himself in his
home for three days until  the recruiters had stopped asking about him. Some of this
difference may be anchored in personal competencies,17 and some in the clerical position
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Farid Bhai was being offered, but it appeared to be structured by a profoundly situated
imaginary of the political in urban Pakistan.
54 The facts of the tactics employed by Karachi residents such as Bushra and Farid Bhai are
not nearly as important as what we lose if we disregard their experiences. People who
anticipated that fear, anxiety and definitive political affiliation were imperative to avoid
or navigate rather than to join demonstrate that political mobilizations in the violent and
territorialized history of Karachi constitute bystanders as well as activists and victims.
Considering these alternate stances prompts us to confront how exactly it is possible for
subjection and subversion to be aligned, and for practices of non-affiliation to perpetuate,




55 The tactics of middle-class bystanders in Karachi associate political affiliation with the
multiple  vulnerabilities  of  physical  harm,  recruitment  and  social  injuries  that  both
undermine culturally normative hierarchy and invite specific oppositional enmities. As a
highly contingent set of subversions, such tactics are complicit in their own subjection as
they  make  space  for  the  very  dangers  of  political  violence  they  avoid.  Just  as
depoliticization and voter apathy are constitutive of ostensibly functional democracies (
e.g. Putnam 2000), the practices of bystanders who do not mobilize are important aspects
of Karachi’s political landscape. The violence of turf politics has been described as a key
feature  of  processes  of  democratization  in  Karachi,  envisioned  through  ongoing
contestation and negotiation between and amongst local stakeholders and state actors
(Baig 2008, Gayer 2003, 2004, 2007, Haq 1995, Hussain 1990, Nichola Khan 2010b, Naqvi
2006, Shaheed 1990, Verkaaik 1994, 2004). The tactical action of those millions subjected
to its effects demonstrates how everyday politics shape people’s lives, and in turn, how
their tactics both enable and subvert political contexts.
56 Bystanders  enact  a  relation  to  the  political  and,  more  importantly,  a  mode  of
participation that corresponds neither to victims nor perpetrators. In Karachi, to sustain
the position of a bystander involves an active set of practices. Not quite a movement, it is
nonetheless eminently social. These tactics fall short of an identity, yet they are a key and
regularly  re-iterated  feature  of  Karachi’s  everyday  life.  The  question  is  not  how  to
motivate this potential group into a solidarity we already recognize, but how we alter our
perspective in order to make palpable the ambivalent work that their emergence has
already done.
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NOTES
1. On ‘resilience,’ see Scheper-Hughes 2008.
2. See notes 7 and 8, below.
3. Drawing analytical attention to those who wait, seek refuge and reject by avoiding violence
builds on a host of scholarship emphasizing how agency is located in normativity and subjection,
rather  than  exclusively  in  forms  of  oppositional  resistance  (e.g. Berlant  2008,  Butler  1997,
Foucault 2004[1975], 1984, Mahmood 2005). 
4. Widely employed in psychology, the ‘bystander effect’ addresses the problem of why people
are  less  likely  to  help  or  intervene  in  a  situation  with  multiple  onlookers.  Conversely,
anthropologists  of  violence  have  criticized  the  ‘anthropologist-as-bystander’  to  assert  the
impossibility of  allegedly objective political  distance from local  entanglements.  Both of these
approaches fault the inaction or conceit of the bystander.
5. For example, Robert Ehrenreich and Tim Cole (2005) distinguish between bystanders who may
resist, acquiesce to, inhibit, instrumentalize while opposing, or not participate while opposing
perpetrators’  actions  (Ehrenreich  &  Cole  2005:  218).  In  addition,  they  note  that  benefits,
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economic or otherwise,  are useful  to consider independently of  personal political  support or
opposition (Ehrenreich & Cole 2005: 218).
6. Alpa Shah describes this as a problem of uncertainty, where political affiliates seek ‘epistemic
clarity—the possibility that on the other side norms and relationships will be more certain. This
is a certainty carved out of uncertainty and ambivalence, a certainty that denies or projects away
uncertainty’ (2009: 284-5).
7. Another key area of analysis is the legality and illegality of land settlements and development,
pioneered by urban planning scholars such as Jan van der Linden, Arif Hasan and Noman Ahmed.
An emergent scholarship explicitly connects political violence with this history and context of
land use, e.g. Budhani et al. 2010, Gayer 2003, 2007.
8. Initially used as a religious term for the early Muslims who fled from Mecca to Medina during
the hijrat, the term Muhajir was mobilized to refer to the Muslim migrants who left India to settle
in Pakistan at Partition (e.g. Ansari 2005: 10, Sipe 1976, Verkaaik 2004: 45-47).  Oskar Verkaaik
observes that, more colloquially, Muhajirs were thought of as mobile, rootless, and as those who
had  left  tradition  behind  in  the  act  of  migration  (2004:  41-49).  Thus,  the  ethno-political
designation of  the category ‘Muhajir’  activated by the MQM, in the early years of  the party,
compounded the religious implications of the term for the hijrat, a sensibility for the sacrifices
made for Pakistan through the processes of migration, and the vociferous declaration of ‘ex-
privilege’ (Berlant 1997: 2) following increasing mobilization of ethnic identity politics: Sindhi,
Punjabi, Pakhtun (cf. Verkaaik 2004: 20-63). By at least the late 1990s, the term Muhajir was most
powerfully associated with MQM politics and its particular tactics of instrumentalizing identity,
in spite of the term having been officially erased from the party rhetoric in 1997.
9. This scholarship is quite extensive. My references here draw largely on anthropologists or
researchers using field research methods. Notable examples include political analyses focusing
on  ethnic  identity  politics  and  political  violence  (Ahmed 1998,  Gayer  2004,  2007,  Haq  1995,
Hussain  1990,  Kennedy  1991,  Malik  1996,  Shaheed  1990,  Tambiah  1996),  party  activists  and
violence (Nichola Khan 2010a, 2010b, Verkaaik 1994, 2004, 2009) and Muhajir women who lost
family members during the course of turf wars and state repression of the MQM, described as
both victims and survivors (Chaudhry 2004, Chaudhry & Bertram 2009, Ayesha Khan 2003). Print
journalism between 1985 and 1995, notably in the Karachi-based weekly English language news
magazine  Herald,  is  especially  informative,  analytically  rich,  and  regularly  cited  in  the
scholarship cited above.
10. The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) is a secular, socialist-leaning party with a strong power
base in Sindh. The party leadership has consistently been occupied by members of the Sindhi
landowning Bhutto family, including the current President of Pakistan Asif Ali Zardari, widower
of the former leader Benazir Bhutto.
11. See Vigh (2006) for an interesting discussion of the ‘everydaying’ of ongoing political and
economic crisis in terms of routinization as ‘the social metamorphosis of change into perceived
continuity’ and its sedimentation into habitus over time (Vigh 2006: 153-4).
12. The  Jamaat-i-Islami  (JI)  and  the  MQM  have  both  historically  drawn  on  support  from
communities and descendants of Partition-era migrants.  Their enmity extends to the student
wings of the respective parties. The student wing of the Jamaat-i-Islami is known as the Islami
Jamiat-i-Talaba (IJT), and the student wing of the MQM is the All-Pakistan Muttahida Students
Organization (APMSO). Until 1997, the APMSO was formerly known as the All-Pakistan Muhajir
Students  Organization,  in  tandem with  the  ethnic  name of  the MQM.  The JI  is  an  explicitly
Muslim  party  that  advocates  for  Sharia  law  and  is  described  by  scholars  as  modernist  and
Islamist. Nichola Khan (2010a) gives a brief overview of the contours of JI-MQM animosity. For
more on the history of the JI in Pakistan, see e.g. Nasr (1994).
13. Between July and August 2011, when hundreds of casualties and injuries were reported in
more  outlying  neighborhoods,  only  two  dead  bodies  in  telltale  gunny  sacks  were  found  in
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Nazimabad. See, e.g. the Supreme Court judgment on the suo moto case regarding law and order
in Karachi, delivered October 6, 2011 (2011: 30).
14. For more detail on this planning scheme, see Hasan (1999: 26-7).
15. See  the  information  provided  by  the  City  District  Government  of  Karachi  website  (
http://14.192.147.139/CDGK/Portals/0/TownMaps/NewKarachi_Map_Large.jpg,  accessed
October 23 2011).
16. The Supreme Court judgment on the widespread political violence in Karachi between July
and  August  2011  maintained  that  the  political  dynamic  in  the  area  has  shifted;  violent
confrontations now occur among politicized groups of Sunni Muslims, between the Barelvi Sunni
Tehreek and the Deobandi Sipah-e-Sahaba (2011: 27).
17. Naqvi  (2006)  describes  these  personal  competencies  as  hesiyat,  a  term  for  which  my
informants used ‘status’ as a gloss.
ABSTRACTS
This article posits an analytic of the bystander, as a supplement to studies of perpetrators and
victims, in relation to political affiliation, mobilization and violence in Karachi. In particular, I
use ethnographic findings to elucidate the tactics of anticipation used by Karachi residents of
neighborhoods  widely  considered  the  turf  of  the  Muttahida  Qaumi  Movement  (MQM).  The
examples of students’ and teachers’ reactions to a college rumble between rival groups, parents’
attempts to keep their sons from being recruited into party politics, and young people confident
in their ability to navigate an economy of affiliation demonstrate a range of bystander tactics, in
which  subjection  and  subversion  are  aligned.  Although  metanarratives  of  democratization
frequently  elide  the  everyday  activity  of  standing  by,  it  constitutes  a  pervasive  mode  of
participation in Karachi’s political landscape.
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